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Judicial Comment On The Concept of
"Banking Business"
C. C. JOHNSTON*
Section 75 (1) of Canada's Bank Act lists activities which banks
may perform. The first four subsections refer to specific activities,
but 75(1) (e) is a broad provision which states that banks may
"engage in and carry on such business generally as appertains to the
business of banking." The purpose of this article will be to examine
the concept of "banking business" in the light of judicial interpreta-
tion.1 One approaches the task with a considerable degree of humility,
for as Chorley has said in his book on banking, "to construct a
definition which would embrace the whole of it is manifestly
impossible".2
The difficulty is increased by the fact that banking, like other
forms of business, continues to develop and expand its activities to
meet its competitors and provide wider services for the public with
the result that any attempt to squeeze the concept into the confines
of a definition may prove successful today but inadequate tomorrow.
A further obstacle to definition is the fact that forms of banking
have frequently been carried on in conjunction with other businesses
and are occasionally so inextricably woven in with these that it is
difficult to isolate the purely banking activities. In other words, the
concept becomes coloured by its close association with other forms
of business and it is sometimes problematical whether a specified
activity is an incident of banking or of some other business. An
example of this intermingling of activities is provided by the loan
and trust companies which carry on certain activities remarkably
similar to those of banking. Such companies take money on deposit,
issue passbooks, pay cheques drawn on these deposits and make loans
on certain securities specified by statute.3
In England, as Chorley points out, the discussion of what exactly
constitutes banking business has become largely academic because of
* Mr. Johnston is in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 "The nature of the business of bankers is a part of the law merchant
and is to be judicially noticed by the Court."-per Lord Campbell in Bank
of Australasia v. Breillat (1847) 6 Moo. P.C. 152 at 173, 13 E.R. 642 at 650.
2 Chorley, Law of Banking, 4th ed. 23.
3 Trust Companies Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 272, sec. 64 (1) (c) & (d).
Loan and Trust Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 222, sec. 139(4).
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the concentration of most of the country's banking in a few great
institutipns.4 In Canada, however, the subject is of more practical
importance because of the division of legislative powers* peculiar to
the British North America Act. By section 91 (15) of the Act, the
Parliament of Canada is given exclusive legislative authority over
banking,5 the incorporation of banks and the issue of paper money.
Such authority has manifested itself in the Bank Act. If a business
carries on activities which may properly be described as "banking",
6
then such a business should be subject to this federal power and, in
particular, to such legislation as the Bank Act. Thus, if the loan and
trust companies, for example, are carrying on what is in fact a
banking business, they should come under the sway of the federal
enactments. Moreover, since the powers in section 91 are exclusive,
any provincial legislation purporting to regulate banking is "ultra
vires"7 and it is perhaps arguable that an act such as Ontario's Loan
and Trust Corporations Act s is "ultra vires" in so far as it relates
to banking activities.
How, then, have the courts determined what is banking business?
The judges, of course, have not defined the concept for their own
academic pleasure, but have done so in an attempt to create a
standard for comparative purposes. Usually the purpose has been
to decide whether a business should come within the authority of
particular banking laws. A survey of the cases reveals three main
approaches to creating such a standard or test. The first is a compre-
hensive listing of all the functions performed by bankers. This is
an absolute standard and any business falling short of it is not a
banking business in the fullest sense. The second is a less demanding
test which contents itself with a majority of the more important
activities carried on by banks. A complicating factor in this second
approach arises where a business combines banking with other forms
of enterprise. In this situation, the courts have used a "balancing
process to determine whether banking is incidental to or forms the
major portion of the business.9 The third approach is the lowest
common denominator test which uses the key activities adjudged by
the court to comprise the very core of banking. Such a standard has
extremely wide application. As is readily seen, all three of these
approaches have their drawbacks. The first is too rigorous, the
second too uncertain and the third too elastic.
4 Chorley, op. cit. 24.
5 The meaning of the term should not be restricted to banking as it was
at the time the Act was passed. See A.G. Alta. v. A.G. Can. (Ref. re Alta.
Bill of Rights Act), [1947) A.C. 503, Viscount Simon at 516; also, [1947] 4
D.L.R. 1 at 9.
6 The federal banking power is "wide enough to embrace every trans-
action coming within the legitimate business of a banker." per Lord Watson
in Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31 at 46.
7 See A.G. Alta. v. A.G. Can., [1939] A.C. 117; A.G. Can. v. A.G. Quebec,
[1947] A.C. 33, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 81, [1946) 3 W.W.R. 659.
8 Op. cit.
9 See Stafford v. Henry (1849) 12 Ir. *Equity 400; In Re Guiness 1 I.R.
Jur. 359.
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Attempts to formulate a comprehensive definition may be illus-
trated by three examples drawn from English, American and Canadian
law respectively. In England, a description of banking embodied in
a statute states that,
'Banking business' means receiving money on current account or deposit;
accepting bills of exchange; making, discounting, buying, selling, collect-
ing or dealing in bills of exchange, promissory notes and drafts whether
negotiable or not, buying, selling or collecting coupons; buying or selling
foreign exchange by cable transfer or otherwise; issuing for subscription
or purchase or underwriting the issue of loans, shares or securities;
making or negotiating loans for commercial or industrial objects; or
granting and issuing letters of credit and circular notes: except in so far
as such operations form part of and are for the purpose of and incidental
to the conduct of a business carried on for other purposes by the com-
pany, firm or individual by whom such operations are transacted.' 0
The definition which we find in Corpus Juris Becondus combines both
the first and third standards.
Banking is the business or employment of a bank or banker, and as
defined by law and custom consists of receiving deposits payable on
demand, discounting commercial paper, making loans of money on
collateral security, issuing notes payable on demand and intended to
circulate as money, collecting notes or drafts deposited, buying and
selling bills of exchange, negotiating loans and dealing in negotiable
securities.... It is said, however, that any person engaged in the business
carried on by banks of deposit, of discount or of circulation is doing a
banking business although but one of these functions is exercised."
Finally, the Canadian case Be Bergethaler WaisenamtI2 contains an
extensive list of banking activities judicially noticed by the Manitoba
Court of Appeal. It was thought that banking consists of receiving
money on deposit from customers; paying a customer's cheques or
drafts on it to the amount on deposit by such customers, and holding
Dominion Government and Bank notes and coin for such purpose;
paying interest by agreement on deposits; discounting commercial
paper; dealing in exchange and in gold and silver coin and bullion;
collecting notes and drafts deposited; arranging credits with banks in
other towns, cities and countries; selling drafts or cheques on other
banks and banking correspondents; issuing letters of credit; lending
money on customer's notes, by way of overdraft and on bonds, shares
and other securities.
A comparison of the three illustrations reveals that, although
there are omissions and slight changes in emphasis in each definition
according to the character of each country's banking system,'3 the
10 Rule #1 of Enemy Banking Business Rules 1918 S.R.O., No. 1649,
made under Trading With The Enemy Amendment Act, 1918.
11 9 Corp. Jur. Sec. 30 (s. 1). See also Mercantile National Bank v. New
York 121 U.S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct Rep. 826 for a similar definition.
12 [1949] 1 D.L.L 769 at 773.
[1949] 1 W.W.R. 321 at 328.
13 "Banking business in Canada... must be conducted on a broader and
somewhat more elastic basis than in fully developed business communities
such as Great Britain, and in construing the powers conferred upon banks to
carry on 'such business generally as appertains to the business of banking'
it is fair that Canadian conditions should be fully considered and allowed for"
per Davies J., Ont. Bank v. McAllister (1910) 43 S.C.R. 338 at 353.
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majority of the functions listed are identical. However, it is clear
that none of the above definitions is exhaustive of banking as we
know it today. For example, banks often act as executors or trustees
and provide other services such as the safe-keeping of valuables.
The Bergetiwler case provides an interesting example of how the
first and second standards have been applied. The issue in that case
was whether a provincial legislature could incorporate a loan, trust
or financial company and vest it with functions which are carried on
by federally chartered banks without thereby invading the exclusive
legislative authority of the Dominion. Speaking for the Manitoba
King's Bench,14 Dysart J. applied the second test and found that a
trust company which carried on many of the functions listed above
was engaged in a banking business. The mere fact that the company
did not repay its customers by cheque drawn on it but, instead, issued
its own cheques drawn on a bank following an oral or written request
from a customer, did not, in the light of the other banking functions
carried on by the company, remove it from the federal jurisdiction.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, however, applied the first test and
came to the opposite conclusion. It found that, besides the omission
mentioned above, the company did not discount or lend on com-
mercial paper but only on direct indebtedness, had no banking
correspondents and did not make a practice of collection for customers
or lending by overdraft. Thus, the company, in not fulfilling all the
functions normally exercised by banks, was not engaged in "banking"
as contemplated by section 91(15) of the B.N.A. Act. 5
In the majority of the cases dealing with this subject, the courts,
faced with the difficulties involved in formulating a comprehensive
definition, have resorted to the third approach and attempted to dis-
cover the essential qualities of banking. Here, as in the first standard,
the problem of historical development has arisen. For example, the
use of the cheque in this century has become an integral part of
modern banking. Lord Ashbourne C., in the Irish case of In Be
-hields Estate,'6 commented on this development.
The Bank of Ireland urge that the primal element in banking Is the
paying out money on cheques. This might be urged possibly now with
some plausibility, but I do not think it could be so argued at the date
of the passing of 33 George 2, c.14. The Bank of Ireland had not then
been founded. Cheques were not at all as common then as now. Printed
cheques were not then general.
Although the Shields case held that a person who took money on
deposit account, paid interest thereon and made term and mortgage
loans, was a banker even though he did not issue cheque books or
honour drafts on demand, it is doubtful whether one could argue
14 [19483 1 D.L.R. 761, [1947] 1 W.W.R. 132.
15 For an American decision holding that trust companies in Kansas
were carrying on a banking business, see State of Kansas ex. rel. Boynton v.
Hayes C.C.A. Kan. 62 F.2d. 597 where Pollock J. states at 601, "calling an
institution a trust company does not prevent its being a bank within the
meaning of the law, if it possesses and exercises all the powers of a bank."
16 [19011 1 IR.R. 172 at 195.
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nowadays that the cheque is not an essential part of banking business.
As Paget says in his book on banking,
Some of the older dicta seem to give undue prominence to the deposit
side of banking. In view of the provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act,
and the later affirmation of cheque business as the leading feature of
a bank, the scale would appear to have turned.7
The use of the cheque is but one of the developments which
have given rise to two views on what comprises the basic qualities
of banking. One view states that the fundamental features of banking
are constant. It is only the modes by which the business is carried
on that change. The other view asserts that banking may be defined
only in terms of the methods by which it is performed. In support
of the first view we find cases such as State Savings Bank of Victoria
v. Permewan, Wright & Co.'8 where it is stated,
The essential characteristics of the business of banking . . . may be
described as the collection of money by receiving deposits upon loan,
repayable when and as expressly or impliedly agreed upon, and the
utilization of the money so collected by lending it again in such sums
as a required....
The methods by which the functions are affected-as by current account,
deposit account at call, fixed deposit account, orders, cheques, secured
loans, discounting bills, note issue, letters of credit, telegraphic transfers,
and any other modes that may be developed by the necessities of business
-are merely accidental and auxiliary circumstances, any of which may
or may not exist in any particular case.
Opposed to this static conception are opinions such as those of Lord
Ashbourne and Paget quoted above which indicate that the key quali-
ties of banking change as the business develops. In the American
case of Marvin v. Kentucky Title Trust Co., McCandless J., speaking
for the Kentucky Court of Appeals, stated that
Originally banking seems to have been restricted to the receiving of
deposits. With the development of the business came the discounting
of paper, the loaning of money and the other varied activities in which
modern banks engage.... Of course, in order to do a banking business,
it is not essential for an institution to exercise all the powers permitted
by its charter. But on the other hand, present day banking business is
not to be confined to the narrow limits of its original inception. It is
well known that insurance companies and other like institutions loan
money, yet they are not banks.... Other illustrations might be given,
but these are sufficient to show that the matter must be considered in
a practical way and in the light of modern conditions. When so done, we
think the above definition from Warren v. Shook1 9 peculiarly apt:
"Having a place of business where deposits are received and paid out
on cheques, and where money is loaned upon security, is the substance
of the business of a bank."20
It seems clear that this latter view is the more acceptable of the
two. Certainly, it is the more practical approach to testing a business
for the purpose of seeing whether it falls within a piece of banking
legislation. The first view is wide enough to include many kinds of
modern businesses which the courts would obviously- not consider to
be banking.
17 Paget's Law of Banking (1961) 6th ed. 8.
18 (1914) 19 C.L.R. 457 at 470.
19 91 U.S. 704.
20 50 A.L.R. 1337 at 1338.
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What, then, are the basic qualities which the courts have held
to be the essentials of banking? An early English case, which has
been cited recently with approval, describes the principal part of a
banker's business as receiving money on deposit, allowing the same
to be drawn against as and when the depositor desires, and paying
interest on the amounts standing on deposit. 21 A similar definition is
contained in a 1932 Ceylonese statute which the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council thought accorded with the English law of that
time. The statute defined a banking company as one which "carries
on as its principal business the accepting of deposits of money on
current account or otherwise, subject to withdrawal by cheque, draft
or order."22 Paget has said that no one can be a banker who does
not take current accounts, pay cheques drawn on himself and collect
cheques for his customers. 23
In the United States, it has been held that "a bank is an
institution empowered to receive deposits of money, to make loans,
to issue its promissory notes, or to perform any one or more of those
functions. '2 4 The New York Surrogate Court has said that a com-
mercial bank is one "making discounts, issuing notes and receiving
deposits on which it may or may not pay interest."25 These three
basic functions are adopted in Corpus Juris Secondus as was noted
above.
In an early Canadian case, Proudfoot V. C. examined the charters
of various pre-confederation banks and stated,
The conclusion which seems to be deducible from these Acts Is, that the
business of banking consists in dealing in money, the precious metals,
and in bonds and negotiable securities; that this dealing confers the power
of lending on them or of purchasing them, whichever the bank directors
may deem most for the advantage of the corporation.2 6
In the Bergethaler case, Coyne J. A. comments on the difficulty of
defining banking, but perhaps overstates the problem when he says,
Banking is not a technical or legal term but a loose popular one, compre-
hending activities carried on by those who, likewise popularly, are called
bankers .... Some are essential to the conception. But very few are
exclusive activities of bankers. Chequing privileges accorded depositors,
and general dealing in credit, are characteristic of and perhaps essential
to banking. But even that does not make them exclusive rights of
bankers .... 27
Contrary to this view, it could be argued that such fundamental
banking activities are exclusive to "banking", if not to "bankers",
and the fact that other businesses carry on these activities does not
make them any less essentially banking.
21 Re Bottomgate Industrial Co-operative Society (1891), 65 L.T.R. 712,
approved R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal [1954) 2 All E.R. 730.
22 See: Bank of Chettinad v. Com. of Income Tax [1948] A.C. 378.
23 Paget, op. cit. 8.
24 U.S. v. Papworth 156 F. Suppl. 842 (adopting a definition from Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.).
25 In re Wilkins Will 226 N.Y.S. 415, 131 Misc. 188.
26 Jones v. Imperial Bank of Canada (1876) 23 Gr. 262 at 275.
27 [1949] 1 D.L.R. 769 at 778.
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From the examples above, it would seem that the key qualities
of banking are these. First, banking is primarily concerned with
dealing in currency. Money is its commodity and its raison d'tre.
Secondly, the methods by which it deals with its commodity may be
divided into primary and secondary. The primary methods are those
which are most directly concerned with manipulating money as a
commodity. Examples of these are the receiving of money on deposit,
the paying out of money according to customer's cheques, the handling
of foreign exchange, the lending of money on customer's notes, on
bonds, shares and other securities and by way of overdraft. The
primary activities are the basis of the third standard. They are
the functions which comprise the very core of banking. The secondary
methods are those which are not so basically concerned with the
actual management of the bank's commodity, but some may involve
the transfer of money in the ordinary commercial sense of buying
and selling. Examples of these are the purchase of stocks and bonds,
the safe-keeping of valuables and the giving of financial advice.
It has been argued that when a business carries on even one
of the primary activities it may properly be called banking. In the
Bottomgate case, Smith J. states,
Moreover, the business embarked on by the society when it took loans
on deposit was in reality a banking business prohibited by statute. It is
not necessary, in our judgement, in order to constitute a banking business
9 rohibited by the statute, that the society should carry on every part of a
usiness carried on by some bankers; it is sufficient to bring the business
within the prohibition, if the society carried on what is the principal
part of the business of a banker, iz., receiving money on deposit, allowing
the same to be drawn against as and when the depositor desires, and
paying interest on the amounts standing on deposit.28
A similar trend of thought may be detected in the American cases.
In Reed v. People, the court takes the following position.
Banks in a commercial sense are of three kinds-of deposit, of discount
and of circulation. Strictly speaking, the term 'bank' implies a place for
the deposit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an
institution. . . . Modem bankers frequently exercise any two or all
three of those functions, but it is still true that an institution prohibited
from exercising any more than one of the functions is a bank, in the
strictest commercial sense.29
However, it should be noted that there is authority for the
opposite view30 and it is clear that the above opinion is open to the
same objection as that raised against the view that the essentials of
banking are traditional and constant. Both views allow a wide variety
of businesses which are primarily not banking to come within the
boundaries of the concept.
28 (1891), 65 L.T.R. 712 at 714. See also Chorley's comment at page 24
of his Law of Banking 4th ed. where, after reciting Paget's essentials of
banking (supra), he states, "It is not, however, easy to see why a banker
should cease to be a banker (legally speaking-no doubt he would com-
mercially) if he only accepted current accounts, or even if he refused to
collect cheques."
29 I1 N.E. 295, 125 Ill. 592; see also State of Kansas v. Hayes, 62 F.2d
597 at 600; Fidelity Inv. Ass. v. Emmerson 235 Ill. App. 518.
30 Dietric v. Rothenberger 75 S.W. 271 at 272; Re Bergethaler Waisen-
amt, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 769 at 776.
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Apart from the three major approaches to the definition of
banking which we have been examining, there is a further test which
has been hinted at in the cases. The test itself has not been strongly
asserted but one is aware, in reading the cases, that the thinking
which underlies the test is an influence on the mind of the court.
The test is whether the public considers the business in question to
be banking. In Re Shieds" Estate, Fitz Gibbon L.J. finds that the fact
that Shields called himself a banker is of considerable importance.
In all his dealings with the public, Shields held his firm out as 'bankers'.
He so described himself for the purpose of inducing custom and giving
dignity to his operations. It may be conceded that people who are not
bankers cannot make themselves so by adopting the name. . . .But
the name was assumed by Shields and the Bank of Ireland accepted It
as a truthful designation. .... From beginning to end they treated him
as a banker. That being so, it is only a question of fact, and one upon
which the presumption is in the affirmative, whether there Is reasonable
evidence to warrant that Shields was what he professed to be, and what
the Bank of Ireland took him to be, namely, a 'banker.'31
This 'holding out' test has been given weight by the courts because
of the peculiar status of the banking business. The bank's role in
society has always been of extreme importance. It stands at the
centre of the economic community and enjoys a public confidence
and trust. Such trust demands a high standard of conduct which
has been assured in most countries by careful government supervision.
This distinction between banking and other businesses is well illus-
trated by a comment from an American case which states,
Banks are quasi public corporations. They may only be organized In such
manner and do such things as the state in which they carry on business
permits them to do; and in carrying out its policy, the state has sur-
rounded banking privileges with many wholesome restraints that are not
applied to ordinary corporations.... The state, through its legislative
department, has at all times exercised a careful and wholesome super-vision over banking institutions for the purpose of protecting the generalpublic from loss, while it has not, except in a general way, undertaken to
control or interfere with the conduct of private corporations not investedwith a public character or performing some public service.g2
Thus, when banking is regarded in the light of "a public character
or performing some public service" it assumes a stature which makes
the use of the name 'bank', and the adoption of a banking facade
of critical importance. In this regard, it is interesting to note that
section 157 of Canada's Bank Act prohibits the use of the terms'bank', 'banking' or 'banker' by any company except authorized banks.
In conclusion, there is no certainty as to which of the three
major approaches the courts will use. Each standard merely repre-
sents a stage in a descending scale which is stringent at one end and
flexible at the other. Probably, the approach most likely to be
employed by the courts nowadays is one falling somewhere between
the first and second standards. The expansion of business in general,which has produced encroachments onht teraditional lines of de-
marcation between businesses, makes it necessary for the courts to
31 [19011 1 IR.R. 172 at 197.32 Eruner v h. Pitizens' Bank 134 Ky 283, 120 S.W. 345.
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apply an exacting test which is closer to the first or absolute standard
than the other two. However, should the courts deem it advisable
that corporations such as the loan and trust companies be brought
under banking legislation for the protection of the public, it is
conceivable that the third approach might be used.
